More People, Less Prosperity - How Migration Erodes Our Per-Capita Income
Europe is growing. The economies of Belgium and the rest of the Union produce more year after year. GDP rises, headlines report progress, and politicians proudly point to growth figures. But there is one number that rarely takes center stage in that debate: income per resident. And that number tells a very different story.
Imagine a country with ten residents and an economy of 100. Income per capita: 10. Now five new residents arrive, and the economy grows to 112. Sounds like progress. But income per capita has fallen to 7.5. The pie has grown, but the slices are smaller. This is no hypothetical model. This is, broadly speaking, what has happened over the past two decades in Belgium and much of Western Europe. Total economic output grows steadily. The population grows through migration even faster. And the result is that the average Belgian, the average Dutch person, the average German has not come out ahead on balance. In many cases, they have fallen behind.
"Migration and economic growth" is a phrase policymakers love to say in the same breath, as if they were one and the same thing. But growth in the total and growth per person are fundamentally different things. We systematically confuse them, sometimes by accident, sometimes not.
The core of the problem does not lie with migration as such. Highly skilled labor migrants who fill a productivity gap can genuinely contribute to the economy. That is true in theory, and in specific cases also in practice. But the reality of migration to Belgium and Europe is different. The largest inflow comes from countries in North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East, regions with significant cultural and economic distance from the European labor market. Labor market participation among these groups is structurally lower. In Belgium, unemployment among people of non-European origin is two to three times higher than the national average. That is not anecdote, those are figures from Statbel and the Federal Planning Bureau.
Those who do not work do not contribute to production. But they do make use of healthcare, education, social security, housing, and infrastructure. The full cost of migration in Belgium is rarely calculated comprehensively, including the second generation, language education, integration programs, legal proceedings, detention centers, and the heavier burden on public services. Studies that do attempt this, such as those by the Itinera Institute, arrive at significant net cost figures per migrant per year.
There is a second mechanism, less visible but equally significant. When large numbers of low-skilled workers enter the labor market, average wages fall. Not equally for everyone, employers benefit from cheaper labor, and highly skilled workers are barely affected. But the middle class and lower-skilled native workers do feel it. They suddenly compete with people willing to work for less, and their bargaining position weakens. The result: income per resident in Europe may grow slightly on paper, but the median, the income of the person in the middle, falls or stagnates. That is precisely why so many ordinary people feel they are not getting ahead, even though economic news reports say otherwise. They are right. They are being systematically misunderstood by an elite that looks at averages rather than distributions.
There is a third factor: inflation. In recent years, Belgian households have experienced an inflationary wave that has significantly eroded their purchasing power. Energy prices, food prices, rental prices, everything became more expensive. Wages followed, but not fully and not for everyone. Migration has a direct relationship with certain prices, particularly rents. A larger population in cities like Brussels, Antwerp, and Ghent drives up demand for housing without supply growing proportionally. Rents rise. Those who already own property benefit. Those who rent - disproportionately young people and those with lower incomes - pay the bill. Population growth and prosperity do not automatically go hand in hand. They do so only when growth is accompanied by proportional investments in infrastructure, housing, and public services. In Belgium, those investments have been structurally insufficient. The government is already running behind, and every new resident widens the gap.
The problem is not only economic. It is also political and cultural. Anyone who questions the economic logic of current migration risks being labeled a populist, or worse. The nuance that migration as a policy tool can produce good or bad outcomes depending on who comes and under what conditions disappears in a black-and-white debate. That taboo has a price. Policy that cannot be honestly evaluated cannot be improved. And in the meantime, costs accumulate: financial, social, infrastructural. Not for the top layer of society, which does not feel the bill. But for the ordinary Belgian, the middle class, the renter, the worker, the pensioner who every year works a little harder for a little less. The economy is growing. That is true. But prosperity is not the same as growth. Prosperity is what remains per person after all costs are paid. And that figure, if we calculate it honestly, has been heading in the wrong direction for years. It is time to put that number at the center of the migration debate. Not out of fear. Not out of hostility. But because honest figures are the foundation of honest policy, and honest policy is the only path to genuine prosperity for everyone who lives here.
Image credits: Omid Armin via Unsplash
