Belgian state reform - a confederation like Switzerland with lower taxes
Belgian state reform needs a clear next step: transform Belgium into a confederation inspired by Switzerland, with more autonomy, stronger responsibility and lower taxes. The current federal system has become too complex, with overlapping powers, too many political layers and an increasingly expensive state. A confederal model could make Belgium simpler, more efficient and more democratic. This is what the biggest coalition party the NV-A already prefers to obtain for the last decennium. Now under the leadership of NV-A prime minister Bart de Wever, the next step in this process can be made, together with the Walloon coalition party the liberal MR that became the largest party in Wallonia.
Belgium is now a federal country in which regions, communities, provinces and the federal government all share authority. This often creates confusion. Who is responsible for mobility? Who pays for social spending? Who carries the burden when budgets fail? A serious Belgian state reform should not make these questions more complicated. It should answer them more clearly.
A confederation offers a logical alternative. In such a model, the member states become the main political units. Belgium’s ten provinces and Brussels could become de facto autonomous states within a loose Belgian framework. Each member state would manage its own budget, taxes, administration, social security, public transport and economic policy. The confederal government would remain responsible only for core tasks such as defence, migration, foreign affairs and security.
The example of Switzerland shows that strong local autonomy does not have to create disorder. On the contrary, Swiss cantons make many of their own decisions, compete with one another and still cooperate where cooperation is useful. That combination of freedom and coordination could also work for Belgium. A confederation based on the Swiss model would bring power closer to citizens and force politicians to govern more efficiently.
Fiscal responsibility is the key principle. Member states that decide how to spend money should also raise their own revenue. That makes policy more transparent. Today, different levels of government can blame each other when things go wrong. In a confederation, that becomes much harder. If a member state wants high spending, it must explain to its own citizens why higher taxes are necessary. If it governs efficiently, it can choose lower taxes.
Those lower taxes are essential. Belgium needs economic breathing space. Work, entrepreneurship and investment are taxed too heavily. When member states control their own tax policy, healthy competition begins. Member states that combine lower taxes with good public services, clear rules and an attractive investment climate will attract companies and talent. Member states that continue with high taxes and inefficient government will face pressure to reform.
This is where Belgium can learn from Switzerland (and the US) Belgium does not have to copy Switzerland entirely, but the Swiss model proves that decentralisation, direct democracy and tax competition can produce stability and prosperity. A new Belgian state reform should therefore do more than transfer powers. It should change the basic logic of government.
Direct democracy can play a major role. Citizens should be able to vote more often on major spending plans, tax increases, institutional reforms and large infrastructure projects. In Switzerland, referendums ensure that politicians must take public opinion seriously. A Belgian confederation could adopt the same principle. When citizens have more control, government becomes more careful with money and power.
Social security can also be organised by member state. Pensions, unemployment benefits, child benefits and labour-market policy do not necessarily have to remain federal. In a confederation, each member state can develop its own social model. A member state that chooses more generous benefits must finance them itself. A member state that chooses activation, economic growth and lighter regulation can move more quickly toward lower taxes and higher employment.
The same applies to national structures such as the railway system. Public transport does not automatically need to be managed centrally. Member states can organise their own railway and mobility contracts, with confederal coordination where cross-border connections are needed. This makes services easier to measure and responsibilities easier to understand. A Belgian state reform based on this logic would reduce duplication and clarify accountability.
Another advantage is that the number of politicians and civil servants can be reduced structurally. The current Belgian system has too many parliaments, ministers, cabinets, committees and administrations. A real confederation must not become another layer on top of the existing system. It must replace unnecessary structures. Less bureaucracy means lower costs, faster decisions and more room for lower taxes.
Public debt must be central to the reform. Belgium cannot continue to live on borrowed money. A confederal model should come with a strict debt-reduction plan. Existing debt could be divided according to a transparent formula or managed through a temporary confederal debt fund. At the same time, member states should be required to balance their budgets structurally. Only then do lower taxes become credible.
Supporters of strict budget reform often point to Javier Milei in Argentina as an example of how fast fiscal discipline can become politically possible. Belgium is not Argentina, but the lesson is relevant: if a government seriously cuts public spending, bureaucracy and political overhead, results can come faster than traditional parties often claim. A new Belgian state reform must therefore also be a budget reform.The Argentinian government debt, a few years ago was 150%, and a lot higher than the one in Belgium that is currently growing towards 110%. Milei was able to reduce the debt quota to under 50% of gdp by cutting the government expenses itself.
The monarchy should also be reconsidered. In a modern confederation, an institution with political influence based on inheritance no longer fits naturally. The monarchy could be abolished or reduced to a purely cultural role without power. Political legitimacy should rest with citizens and member states, not with symbolic institutions. Like in Switzerland ministers can rotate prime minister function each time for 6 months.
Brussels would have a special but clear role in this model. Brussels could become an autonomous member state within the confederation, with its own taxes, budget and responsibilities. This would reduce endless community-based disputes. The ten provinces would also gain real political meaning as autonomous member states. Government would become more local, more recognisable and more democratic.
A Belgian state reform inspired by Switzerland is therefore not the end of cooperation. It is a modern form of cooperation. Belgium would continue to act together where that makes sense, but would grant freedom where central control mainly creates delay and cost. By combining autonomy, direct democracy, tax competition and lower taxes, Belgium could give its economy the oxygen it urgently needs. The choice is simple: continue with complexity, or build an efficient confederation that rewards responsibility.
Image credits: Osmin Serban via Unsplash
